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The ANC’s relationship with the Communist Party contributed to its development into a liberation movement which attracted large sections of the working class as well as the Coloured and Indian communities.By Thando Ntlemeza
In one of his nineteenth century political letters Engels stated that: ...I am sufficiently revolutionary not to renounce absolutely combined actions with other parties in circumstances when they are more advantageous or less harmful to us. With this statement, Engels was expressing a view to the effect that he did not have any problem with the Communist Party forging alliances with other organisations, as long as such alliances would help to advance the revolution. Lenin took the issue further by providing a scientific perspective to justify the alliances between communist parties and liberation movements. In particular, Lenin advocated an idea that in any revolutionary struggle there should be room for tactical compromises to pave the way for a further revolutionary advance – a theoretical perspective which must guide our analysis of the contradictions and struggles in South Africa.
In 1910, the Dutch and British descendants in South Africa entered into a governing arrangement premised on the political and social subordination, exclusion and oppression of the people who were viewed and treated as foreigners in their own country. At the time, South Africa was characterised by racial discrimination, class exploitation and patriarchal relations of power. Or, governance and socio-economic life in the country was based on race, class exploitation of black workers on the grounds of race and the triple oppression of women on the basis of race, class and gender.
In the light of the inter-connectedness of national, class and gender-related contradictions, organisations opposed to oppression needed a perspective to guide their struggle to resolve the contradictions in society. This perspective was not a product of mere thumb-sucking; but originated from what Lenin referred to as an analysis of the concrete conditions in society, as well as from a theory of colonial revolution that was, in Lenin’s time, evolving in certain European countries and other parts of the world.
Lenin and colonial revolution
It was at the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organisations of the Eastern Peoples that Lenin expressed his innovative views about (what we can generally refer to as) the national content of class struggle. In particular, Lenin unequivocally stated that:
...the socialist revolution in each country would be neither solely nor chiefly a struggle of the revolutionary proletariat against their respective bourgeoisie, but rather a struggle by all the imperialist oppressed colonies and countries against international imperialism
The Congress confirmed Lenin’s novel approach to the socialist revolution. In particular, it resolved that, whilst the primary task of communists was to establish communist parties in Eastern Europe and other colonial societies elsewhere in the world, communist parties were expected to provide political support to the national liberation movements in those countries to defeat western imperialism. However, Lenin was quick to concede that solutions to the problems of colonial revolution were not to be found in any communist literature.
The Second Congress of the Comintern held in Moscow and Petrograd in July 1920 deliberated on matters related to the colonial revolution and adopted the thesis on the national and colonial questions. This congress emphasised that communist parties have to politically support national liberation movements, which are revolutionary and when exponents of these movements do not hinder the work of educating and organising oppressed people. In characterising the Second Congress, commentators expressed views to the effect that this Congress was a witness to Lenin’s thesis on the national and colonial questions.
At the 6th Congress held in Moscow, in 1928, communists from all over the world seriously debated the colonial situation in South Africa and then supported the establishment of the “black republic” where all the racial groups would enjoy equality. This was justified on grounds that in South Africa:
... the majority of the population is black and so is the majority of workers and peasants...Hence the national question ...lies at the foundation of the revolution... Expressing his own views on the resolution, Comrade Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo) argued that the resolution represented a rejection of the Communist Party’s long standing position that the struggle was first and foremost a struggle for socialism. Comrade Mzala argued that the resolution meant that the struggle for national liberation would have to precede the struggle for socialist transformation in colonial societies such as South Africa. Mzala assumed that class exploitation would persist after the resolution of the national contradiction; hence he cautioned against the classical drive by elitist elements among the oppressed people to gain power to replace the oppressor in the exploitation of the masses.
The evolution and nature of the relationship. In many of the countries that were either embracing or sympathetic to the communist paradigm, the relationship between national and class struggles found expression in various, but related ways. In our country, this relationship is expressed through a relationship between the ANC, the Communist Party and the labour movement. It was in 1929 that the Communist Party decided to be in an alliance with the ANC – a move that was based on the resolution of the Executive Committee of the Communist International which required “The Party ... [to] pay particular attention to the embryonic national organisations among the natives, such as the African National Congress.”
Deriving authority and mandate from this resolution, the Communist Party has made enormous contributions to building the ANC into a revolutionary liberation movement. This seems to have started as far back as 1927 with ANC’s President Josiah Gumede and an ANC delegation visiting the Soviet Union and Gumede’s subsequent embracement of Communist Russia as a genuine friend of the oppressed masses.
Building the ANC involved theoretical and ideological development, locating ANC among the ordinary masses and positioning it to lead the revolution. Not so long ago, Kgalema Motlanthe reminded us of the contribution of the Communist Party in equipping many members and leaders of the ANC with the tools of analysis they needed to successfully execute the struggle for freedom and liberation in South Africa. All this was done to strengthen the alliance because of a collective belief that the alliance is an appropriate vehicle through which both the national and class struggles could be successfully fought.
The ANC and Communist Party built the alliance into a characteristic feature of the struggle before and after the 1994 elections. While the Communist Party made enormous contributions and sacrifices in building ANC into a ‘real’ revolutionary movement and in developing its theoretical tools for social analysis, the Communist Party learned many things from the ANC, which have helped to develop its theoretical and ideological skills and to ground its struggle in the realities of the country.
Whereas the relationship between national and class struggles in South Africa dates back to the late 1920s, it was only after World War II that this relationship assumed organisational forms. Underlying it was a commitment to act in unity to advance the struggle to liberate the oppressed people as well as to achieve the objectives of the national democratic revolution.
The Communist Party, as a vanguard party of the working class, was central in mobilising the working class.
In 1981, at the 60th anniversary of the South African Communist Party, the late President Oliver Tambo skilfully distinguished this revolutionary alliance from all other alliances. In particular, Tambo reminded it that it:
"... is not merely a paper alliance, created at conference tables and formalised through the signing of documents and representing only an agreement of leaders. ..., [but] a living organism that has grown out of struggle... [which] we have built ...out of our separate and common experiences."
In his view, this strategic alliance is based on a broad agreement on the strategic objective of our revolution to create and build the non-racial, non- sexist, democratic and prosperous society envisaged in the Freedom Charter.
The existence of the alliance does not necessarily mean that the Communist Party will not lead the struggle for victory of the socialist revolution. Neither does it mean that the trade union movement will not lead the struggles of the workers for higher wages and better working conditions. In fact, each component remains an independent part of the whole. This, in essence, means that each component is expected to develop and implement its own policies, without imposing them on its allies. On major policy matters, alliance components must consult and reach consensus. Whereas consultations must take place, “it is not expected that the ... organisations should as a condition of the alliance agree on all the policy matters”. Instead, the alliance must identify key issues they may agree on to take the revolution forward, and act upon them.
However, the relationship between national and class struggles in South Africa has not evolved without difficulties. From the start, this alliance faced resistance within the component organisations. Concerns were expressed within the Communist Party about possible dilution of the class struggle and subjection of the class to the national struggle. In the 1930s and 1940s, there were concerns in the ANC about the fact that white people dominated leadership structures of the Communist Party and that the Party embraced communism – a foreign ideology. Hence, anti-communist leaders and members mobilised against President Josiah Gumede because he embraced communists. Resistance against the communists was alive in the ANCYL in the 1940s. It was the youth leaders such as Anton Lembede, Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo who led this anti-communist resistance.
Who leads the revolution and the alliance?
Leadership of the liberation struggle was debated for some time. While the debates on the matter kept on coming up in one way or the other, the matter was finally and decisively settled in favour of a view that the national character was primary to the struggle for freedom and liberation in South Africa. Confirming this, The Road to South African Freedom states that it is:
a national democratic revolution which will overthrow the colonialist state of White supremacy and establish an independent state of National Democracy in South Africa.
The main content of this revolution is the national liberation... [of The African people]
Taking the matter further, Nqobizitha Mlilo states that some people believed that:
...Once the national character ... was taken as primary, there could hardly be dispute as to who should lead the struggle and therefore the Alliance.”
Ngoako Ramatlhodi argues that the debate of the leadership of this revolution was ultimately settled in favour of the ANC. In his view, this was premised on the analysis of subjective and objective reality; not on the grounds that the ANC is a “big brother” merely because it was formed in 1912 whilst other alliance partners were formed much later.
This revolution cannot be a mere workers’ struggle. It is the struggle to liberate the oppressed people, majority of whom are African and women. Even if it is to accept a view that it is a struggle of the workers, upon close examination of these workers one will note that these workers, in the main, comprise the African people who are poor and underdeveloped. Hence, the main content of the revolution is the liberation of the African people in particular and blacks in general. Whilst coloured and Indian people have been involved in the struggle, it is the African people who constitute the substantial part of the motive forces of the revolution. An approach to leadership depends on the main contradictions the struggle seeks to resolve. In this case, it is commonly accepted in the alliance and broad movement for liberation that the national question is a dominant contradiction. For this reason, an alliance between the ANC and Communist Party was formed on the basis that the ANC was best positioned to lead the national liberation struggle in South Africa.
The ANC must also master the art and science of managing secondary contradictions in the ANC, the alliance and the society
"...if the Party ... has reservations about any aspect of the policies of any fraternal organisation, [they] must place these reservations before such an organisation officially, openly and legitimately at a meeting of representatives of the organisations.
Challenges in the current phase of the revolution
Each phase of the revolution presents its own challenges. These challenges may be attributed to internal or external factors. For this reason, all the interventions that are aimed at resolving the challenges facing the movement and the revolution are supposed to take into account the realities of that particular phase. Our analysis must do this.
The 1994 democratic breakthrough was an outstanding achievement as state power was transferred to the liberation forces after many decades of mass struggle including armed resistance. The liberation alliance was clear that the contradictions created by apartheid colonialism remained after the capture of state power.
For the first time, many of the leaders had to strike a balance between organisational work and the work associated with the state. Given the urgency of state work, unfamiliarity with the related processes and the material benefits associated with deployment, focus shifted more to working within the democratic state. This had a negative impact on the internal programmes of the ANC such as the political education of members and building capacity of the deployed members to be able to strike a balance between party and state work.
The de-racialisation of the ownership, accumulation and allocation of capital is designed to empower historically marginalised sections of the population. Shamefully this correct policy was and is abused by deployees within the state to make as much money as possible.
The question is to what extent are counter-revolutionary forces responsible for corrupting political leaders, activists and public servants? As Charles Tilly warns: ‘ an analysis of a ... revolution, which provides no understanding of the presence of counter revolutionary forces leaves us unsatisfied.’
However, corruption within the state cannot be solely attributed to politicians and officials. As Soma Pillay points out: ‘corruption is not limited [only] to the actions of the politicians and public servants. Rather, the problem is widespread.’
corruption is not limited [only] to the actions of the politicians and public servants. Rather, the problem is widespread.
It is important to note that the influence of private capital also manifests itself in the structures and organisational processes of the ANC and its alliance partners. The ANC, in its documents, has identified the very serious negative impact on the movement of the use of money to lobby for positions of power and influence.
There are some business people who join the ANC merely to advance their business interests. Others bribe members at various levels of the organisation to push for some positions that will ultimately benefit them. However, there are many other patriotic business people who support the movement with finances to enable it to advance a people’s cause because they firmly believe in the cause it pursues.
There are even allegations that some union leaders mobilise resources from capital for their lobbying and promise to tone down workers’ radicalism.
All is not gloom and doom. There are many ANC and alliance cadres, political leaders and functionaries as well as public servants who remain honest and committed to advancing the revolutionary process.
Can we say “the alliance is still relevant”?
There are numerous critics, both from the left and the right of the political spectrum, who assert that the alliance has failed to deliver on its policy undertakings and mandates. The broad movement also faces serious challenges from breakaways such as the EFF, NUMSA and the projected United Front.
A weakened organisation should be distinguished from an irrelevant organisation.
Serious internal challenges may exist, but the alliance remains very strategic to deepen and advance the revolution. Its task remains that of mobilising the people in various sectors of society, and searching for answers to the challenges facing the country and its people. In the process, the alliance must ensure that its components are not dragged into divisive internal battles at the expense of the core constituencies and the revolution. The alliance has to be vigilant and “... continue to search for better ways to respond to the new challenges” facing the alliance and the revolution. Splitting the alliance will not be in the interest of any of the alliance components.
Each component of the alliance is supposed to respect the right of other components “to discuss and arrive at their decisions on how they seek to pursue their strategic objectives.” It must identify, expose and condemn to the political wilderness all those who are responsible for destroying the alliance and its components from within by, among other things, promoting factionalism, purging certain members, neglecting interests of their core constituencies or prioritising personal agendas which are distinct from the interests of the motive forces of the revolution.
Despite the challenges, the alliance has not yet reached the state of total paralysis. Revolutionary theory teaches us to understand the dual character of the challenges facing an organisation. It helps us to appreciate that, while the challenges may be disruptive to the alliance and its programmes, they also provide enlightening lessons about the contradictions within the alliance and its components and how best to respond to and resolve these very contradictions.
As and when we deliberate on the strategic and tactical responses to the challenges facing the alliance and its components, we must understand that on our mere desire or will to change things are not more important than the actual conditions that should be changed. Neither must it over-estimate the strength of the forces that seek to destabilise the alliance to the extent of mistaking superficial appearances with actual reality.
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